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Judicial Elections:
Changes and Challenges
Jan Witold Baran

T

oday, myriad approaches for selecting judges exist and
few states—if any at all—use identical schemes. In many
states, the selection methods vary depending on whether
the judge is a trial or appellate judge, or an initial selection or
an incumbent. As will be seen, the vast majority of state judges
are elected. Recently, judicial campaigns have become increasingly controversial while traditional restraints have fallen to
the wayside. This article will address the variety of election
methods, the challenges that recent constitutional decisions
have presented to the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, and
whether innovations, such as public financing, offer a solution.

MODERN STATE SCHEMES

Despite the wide variance among states and the fact that no
two states go about judicial selection exactly the same, it’s possible to classify the different methods by general category. The
following summary, largely from the American Bar
Association’s Standing Committee on Judicial Independence
(ABA), considers state high courts, intermediate appellate
courts, and trial courts separately.
STATE HIGH COURTS

Called “supreme courts” in 48 states, these courts typically
represent the highest level of judicial review that a state offers.
According to the ABA, 38 states have some type of judicial
election at this highest level. Six states1 have partisan elections, 15 have nonpartisan elections,2 and 17 have uncontested
retention elections3 after an initial appointment. The remaining 12 states either grant life tenure to judges, or use some
form of reappointment.4 States that appoint judges to an initial term without an election still undertake the process differ-

Footnotes
1. Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West
Virginia. In Illinois and Pennsylvania, judges must first win their
initial term through a contested partisan election. Thereafter, they
run in uncontested retention elections for subsequent terms.
A.B.A. Standing Committee on Judicial Independence, Fact Sheet,
available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/fact/html
(June 7, 2006) [hereinafter Fact Sheet].
2. Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
3. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, New England, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming all have
uncontested retention elections after an initial appointment. Id.
New Mexico modifies the method by initially appointing judges
who then face a contested partisan election for a full term, and then
run in uncontested retention elections for subsequent terms. Id.
4. Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maine, New
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ently. In 23 states, the governor appoints judges to the highest
court with the assistance of a commission.5 In contrast, while
the governor appoints the judges in California, Maine, New
Jersey and New Hampshire, he or she does so without the aid
of any such commission.6 The legislature chooses judges in
both South Carolina and Virginia.7
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS

Thirty-nine states have intermediate appellate courts.8
Among those states, 5 choose intermediate appellate judges

5.

6.
7.
8.

Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Virginia, and South Carolina.
See Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A
Special Report, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y (1999), available at
http://www.ajs.org/js/berkson_2005.pdf, at 6 (last visited June 9,
2006). This method is also used by the District of Columbia, with
the exception that in lieu of a governor, the President of the
United States makes all appointments to the D.C. Court of
Appeals (the highest court) and D.C. Superior Court (trial court).
See Judicial Selection in the States: District of Columbia, available
at http://www.ajs.org/js/DC_methods.htm (lasted visited June 9,
2006).
See Berkson, supra note 5, at 6-7.
Id. at 7.
See Fact Sheet, supra note 1. The states that do not have intermediate appellate courts are Delaware, Maine, Montana, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming.

eral jurisdiction trial courts depending on the county or judicial district. For example, in Indiana, the governor appoints
trial court judges in Lake and St. Joseph counties from lists of
names submitted by local nominating commissions, but the
voting public elects trial judges in other counties.20 Those
elections are partisan except for Allen County, where judges
run without party designation.21 As with other judicial
appointments, the legislature appoints trial judges in both
South Carolina, and Virginia and the governor forgoes the aid
of a nominating commission in Maine, New Hampshire, and
New Jersey.22
EVALUATING THE DIFFERENT METHODS

A preliminary question is whether judges should be elected
or appointed, but additional questions arise depending on that
answer. If judges are elected, should the election be partisan
or nonpartisan? If appointed, what benefits does commission
input provide? Finally, once the initial selection has been

through partisan elections9 and 12 hold nonpartisan elections.10 Of the 22 states that initially appoint judges, 14 states
require that incumbents run in uncontested retention elections,11 while the remaining 8 states either grant life tenure or
use a reappointment method.12 As with state supreme court
appointments, the legislature appoints judges in both South
Carolina and Virginia, and the governor makes his or her
appointments without the aid of a nominating commission in
California and New Jersey.13
Such a commission assists the governors of the remaining
eighteen states when they appoint intermediate appellate
judges.14
TRIAL COURTS OF GENERAL JURISDICTION

Thirty-nine states hold elections of some kind for trial
courts.15 Eight states hold partisan elections for all trial court
judges,16 while 20 states have nonpartisan elections.17 Seven
states appoint trial judges,18 but hold uncontested retention
elections. Four states19 use different selection systems for gen-

9. Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Texas.
10. Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and
Wisconsin.
11. Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
and Utah.
12. Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, South Carolina, and Virginia.
13. See Berkson, supra note 5, at 7.
14. Id.
15. See Fact Sheet, supra note 1. Eleven states (Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia)
either grant life tenure or use reappointment of some type for all
general jurisdiction trial courts. Id.
16. Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee,
Texas, and West Virginia hold partisan elections. Id.

17. Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin all hold nonpartisan elections. Id.
18. Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, New Mexico, Utah, and
Wyoming use uncontested retention elections. Id.
19. The types of election vary by county or district in Arizona,
Indiana, Kansas, and Missouri. Id.
20. See Judicial Selection in the States: Indiana, available at
http://www.ajs.org/js/IN_methods.htm (last visited June 9, 2006).
21. Id. In Kansas, the method of selection varies by judicial district
(17 districts select district court judges using a nominating commission, while 14 use partisan elections). See Berkson, supra note
5, at 7. The public elects most Missouri trial court judges in partisan contests, but four counties appoint the judges based on a
commission’s recommendation. Id.
22. See Berkson, supra note 5, at 7.
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made, should the judge be subject to an uncontested retention
election or reappointment, or enjoy a life tenure?
ELECTION OR APPOINTMENT

During the colonial era, the king chose all judges. That pattern survived the Revolution as governors of the newly formed
states continued to appoint state judges in the early years of the
Union.23 Popular election, however, is the essence of a democracy and in 1832, Mississippi became the first state to constitutionally decree the election of judges. Every state that entered
the Union between 1846 and 1912 similarly provided for judicial elections. Supporters of popular election believe that
accountability is of paramount importance and contend that as
policymakers, judges resemble legislators: if judges make policy
decisions, the absence of direct electoral accountability is contrary to democratic principles. Further, some believe that elections increase representation of women and minorities on the
bench.24 Despite these benefits, some critics perceive the election of judges as potentially problematic, charging that such
selection compromises judicial independence.25 Beyond the
obvious problem that campaigning judges might take positions
on issues they will later face on the bench,26 concerns also exist
regarding attorneys who contribute financially to campaigning
judges and then subsequently appear before them in court.
Such a relationship threatens the judge’s required impartiality.
Additionally, voters in some judicial elections—forced to
choose from a seemingly indiscernible pool of candidates without the benefit of traditional campaign rhetoric—may not be
sufficiently informed to make intelligent voting decisions and
may simply decide to not vote.
Supporters of judicial appointment argue that the method
mitigates the problems that come with elections and results in
the selection of judges based on professional qualifications
rather than political success. Advocates believe this approach
de-politicizes the process, but critics contend that the process
is still inherently political and that an appointment process,
often undertaken by a nominating committee or commission,
merely “substitutes committee politics for electoral politics.”27
Interest groups will inevitably promote their interests to the
best of their ability, regardless of the judicial selection mechanism, and so the appointment method succumbs to the same
politicization as an election, but without the accompanying
accountability.

23. See id. at 1.
24. Tanya L. Green, The American Judiciary: Understanding Federal
and State Courts, available at http://www.cwfa.org/articledisplay
.asp?id=7296&department=LEGAL&categoryid=legalother (last
visited June 12, 2006).
25. See e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY
JUDICIARY, available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeopardy/pdf/
report.pdf (last visited June 11, 2006).
26. See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 US 765 (2002)
(finding that First Amendment speech provisions prohibit states
limiting judicial candidates’ speech).
27. Michael DeBow, Judicial Selection White Papers: The Case for
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PARTISAN OR NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS

On one hand, partisan elections embody the very sort of
political divisiveness cited by critics of judicial elections.
Critics of partisan elections, alleging that such selection affects
the behavior of judges on the bench, cite to the fact that the
average tort award varies dramatically between partisan and
nonpartisan states. According to one study, this is particularly
true for out-of-state defendants, against whom the average tort
award is $276,320 in nonpartisan states compared to an eyebrow-raising $652,720 in partisan states.28 On the other hand,
partisan elections provide the voter a quick and generally accurate way of distinguishing candidates who may be otherwise
fungible to the average, nonlawyer voter.
Returning to the theme of accountability to voters, supporters of partisan elections argue that “[a]ccountability requires
institutional arrangements that strengthen voters’ ability to
select officials who will . . . govern consistently with the majority’s policy preferences.”29 While voters may not be able to
readily evaluate different judges’ judicial philosophies and
qualifications, they are able to choose between a Republican or
Democrat and the corresponding policy stances.
THE BENEFIT OF COMMISSION INPUT

The vast majority of state governors who appoint judges do
so with the assistance of a commission. Under this method, a
commission actively locates, recruits, investigates, and evaluates potential judges. At the conclusion of this process, that
commission advances a list of names to the governor, who
makes a final selection. This process, favored by the American
Bar Association, the American Judicature Society, and others,
endeavors to choose applicants on the basis of their qualifications rather than political or social connections. Furthermore,
this approach recognizes that a single governor, acting alone,
often lacks the time, resources, or possibly even knowledge to
parse out the best qualified potential judges from a crowded
legal field.
UNCONTESTED RETENTION ELECTIONS,
REAPPOINTMENT OR LIFE TENURE

States first implemented retention elections to provide for
public participation in the selection process while still excluding partisan politics, believing that the elimination of party
labels and campaigns would help voters focus on the record
and professional qualifications of sitting judges.30 Unless

Partisan Elections, Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy
Studies, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/
White%20Papers/judicialelection.htm (last visited June 12, 2006)
[hereinafter DeBow].
28. Alexander Tabarrok and Erik A. Helland, Partisan Judicial
Elections and Home Court Advantage, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES,
available at http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article
.asp?id=225 (last visited June 12, 2006).
29. DeBow, supra note 27, at 7-8.
30. Kevin M. Esterline, Judicial Accountability the Right Way, 82
JUDICATURE 206 (1999); William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, The
Roll-off Effect in Judicial Retention Elections, 24 SOC. SCI. J. 415, 418
(1987).

given a strong reason to do otherwise, voters generally have
supported the judges in such elections: from 1964 to 1998—
only 52 of 4,588 judges running in retention elections lost.31
In this regard, the system has proven effective as a means for
the voting public to hold judges accountable. Implicit in this
accountability, however, some critics have found the potential
for abuse by interest groups. Any judge who strikes down a
popular law, renders an arguably lenient sentence, or otherwise
makes an unpopular decision may, in doing so, imperil his or
her reelection. For example, after the Florida Supreme Court
in 1990 struck down a state law requiring minor girls to obtain
parental consent before obtaining abortions, the Florida Right
to Life Committee unsuccessfully sought to defeat Chief
Justice Leander Shaw.32 The result of such action is awareness
on the part of judges that while they are ostensibly independent, an unpopular decision might prove fatal to their return
to the bench. Such an awareness, some may argue, inevitably
politicizes the judges’ decision making. While reappointments
and life tenures may cure this problem of politicized decision
making, such approaches also deprive the public of accountability on the part of the judiciary.

Since 1924 the American Bar Association has produced
ethics guidelines for judges. Originally called “Canons,” subsequent revisions in 1972 and 1990 have renamed the document the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (“Model Code”).33
Each state judiciary and the federal judiciary (except the
Supreme Court of the United States) uses the Model Code as a
starting point for its own ethics rules. Since 2003, a joint commission of the ABA has reviewed the current Model Code in an
effort to update and improve the guidance to judges.34 While
the joint commission intended to conclude its work by the
summer of 2006, it was unable to do so. Among the key reasons for its inability to finish in the allotted time was the
increasing difficulty in applying the current Canon 5 of the
current Model Code, which pertains to conduct by judges and
candidates in the course of election campaigns and judicial
selection processes.
Canon 5 seeks to regulate the behavior of judicial candidates. This is both a practical and constitutional challenge. In
light of the variety of election/selection processes noted above,

it is difficult to draft the Model Code to adapt to all such variations. It is therefore not surprising that Canon 5 is the canon
most revised by state jurisdictions when they form their own
ethics code. Canon 5 in general mandates that “[a] judge or
judicial candidate shall refrain from inappropriate political
activity.”35 The tricky part is determining what constitutes
“inappropriate activity.” In general, for example, judges and
candidates are warned not to act as leaders or officeholders in
political organizations, publicly endorse or oppose candidates
for public office, attend political gatherings, or solicit campaign contributions.
Regardless of whether a state adopts any of the specific proscriptions, there is increasing uncertainty about the constitutionality of some of the provisions. The uncertainty began
with the 2002 decision of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.36 The White
decision struck down a provision of Minnesota’s then version
of Canon 5. The clause prohibited judicial candidates from
announcing their views “on disputed legal or political issues.”
This “announce clause” appeared in the 1972 version of the
Model Code but had been removed from the current 1990 version. The Supreme Court held that the announce clause violated the First Amendment rights of candidates, and remanded
the case to the court of appeals for further consideration of
other Minnesota provisions. Subsequently, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit held that other Canon 5
clauses, like the announce clause, also were unconstitutional.37
Specifically, the Eighth Circuit struck down provisions that
prohibited candidates from identifying themselves as members
of a political organization, attending political gatherings, using
endorsements from political organizations, and personally
soliciting contributions. The Supreme Court, notwithstanding
an amicus brief from the ABA begging for review,38 denied a
petition for certiorari.39
In addition to the Minnesota decisions, federal courts also
have been asked to enjoin another provision of Canon 5,
specifically the so-called commit clause. This provision provides that judges and candidates shall not “with respect to
cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the
court, make pledges, promises or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative
duties of the office.” 40 District courts in Kentucky,41 North

31. Larry T. Aspin, Trends in Judicial Retention Elections, 1964-1998,
83 JUDICATURE 79 (1999).
32. G. Alan Tarr, State Judicial Selection and Independence, in JUSTICE IN
JEOPARDY, supra note 25, at appendix D-8.
33. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preface (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/toc.html [hereinafter MODEL
CODE].
34. See ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct, http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/home.html (last
visited June 21, 2006).
35. MODEL CODE Canon 5 (2004)
36. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 US 765 (2002). See
also Jan Witold Baran, Judicial Candidate Speech After Republican

Party of Minnesota v. White, COURT REVIEW, Spring 2002, at 12; Roy
A. Schotland, Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?, COURT
REVIEW, Spring 2002, at 8.
37. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir.
2005).
38. See Brief for American Bar Association, as Amici Curiae, Dimick v.
Republican Party, No. 05-566, available at http://www.abanet.org/
amicus/briefs/holton06.pdf
39. Dimick v. Republican Party, 126 S. Ct. 1165 (2006).
40. MODEL CODE Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i)(2004).
41. Ackerson v. Ky. Judicial Ret. and Removal Comm’n, 776 F. Supp.
309 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (as applied to administrative matters,
“pledge” and “commit” clauses fail strict scrutiny).

ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
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Dakota,42 and Kansas43 have enjoined this clause in the respective state judicial codes on the grounds that it is too vague and
impinges on First Amendment rights. Moreover, lawsuits have
been filed in various states, including Alabama,44 Kentucky,45
and Pennsylvania,46 challenging provisions that bar judicial
candidates from answering questionnaires from organizations.
Finally, recent controversies have arisen regarding the interpretation of the clause47 that prohibits judges from endorsing
candidates. In Texas the judicial disciplinary committee has
proposed to sanction a state supreme court justice who made
public statements in support of his former colleague, Harriet
Miers, who in the fall of 2005 was nominated by President
George Bush for the United States Supreme Court.48 The statements were interpreted as improper “endorsements” under
Canon 5. The Texas justice has vowed to challenge the sanction as a violation of his First Amendment speech rights. In
addition, several judges on the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit appeared as witnesses before the Senate
Judiciary Committee in support of the nomination of their
then-colleague, Judge Samuel Alito, who also was then a nominee to the Supreme Court of the United States.49 While to
date there is no indication of disciplinary proceedings against
the judges, public reports quoted ethics experts on the issue of
whether the judges’ statements were improper endorsements
under the Code of Conduct for United States Judges, which
warns judges not to “publicly endorse or oppose a candidate
for public office.”50
In short, multiple provisions of Canon 5 are under both
practical and legal challenges. This makes campaigning for
judicial office more complicated and makes the job of the ABA
in rewriting the Model Code a daunting task.
PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS

Amid all the challenges and uncertainties surrounding judicial campaigns, there is a faint glimmer of positive change.
North Carolina, subsequent to a proposal by the ABA and its

42. N.D. Family Alliance, Inc. v. Bader, 361 F. Supp. 2d. 1021 (D.N.D.
2005) (“pledge” and “commit” clauses fail strict scrutiny).
43. Kansas Judicial Watch v. Stout, ___ F. Supp. 2d ____, 2006 WL
2038045, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 50765 (D. Kan. July 19, 2006)
(granting preliminary injunction against enforcement of “pledge”
and “commit” clauses as well as prohibition on solicitation of support).
44. Pittman v. Cole, 117 F. Supp. 2d 1285 (S.D. Ala. 2000) (enjoining
ban on answering voter guide), vacated and remanded, 267 F.3d
1269 (11th Cir. 2001) (reversing for want of ripeness).
45. Family Trust Foundation of Ky. v. Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672
(E.D. Ky. 2004) (“pledge” and “commit” clauses are overbroad
because they cover more than promises to rule in a particular way
on an issue likely to come before court), stay denied sub nom.
Family Trust Foundation of Ky. v. Ky. Judicial Conduct Comm’n,
388 F.3d 224 (6th Cir. 2004).
46. Pa. Family Inst. v. Black, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29735 (M.D. Pa.
2005) (dismissing for lack of ripeness).
47. MODEL CODE Canon 5(B).
48. See Pete Slover, Panel Rebukes Justice, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May
24, 2006, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/haredcontent/
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Commission on Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns,51
adopted a public funding system for appellate candidates.52
One of the most nettlesome ethics issues in judicial campaigns
is the manner in which they are funded. Like all other political campaigns, those of judges are increasingly expensive.
Unlike other major statewide campaigns, campaigns for offices
like a state supreme court do not have a large or diverse potential private fundraising base. Contributions to judicial candidates unsurprisingly most often come from members of the bar
or private parties with interests before the courts. Not only is
this source of funding a potential special interest, it usually is
not large enough to provide sufficient resources for expensive
campaigns. For these reasons, the ABA has encouraged states
to consider providing public funding to provide financial
resources and dilute the dependence on private funding.
Public funding of judicial campaigns had been adopted in
Wisconsin in the 1970s. However, it has never been sufficiently funded. North Carolina, in contrast, adopted and
funded a public financing system. The program provides for
threshold eligibility requirements and potential maximum
public funding of slightly over $200,000. Additional public
funds are available under certain conditions.
In 2004, 12 out of 16 eligible candidates qualified for public funding. Out of five seats up for election, two of which
were for the state supreme court, four seats were won by candidates who participated in the public financing program.
Almost $1.5 million was distributed to the 12 participating
candidates, and the public subsidy accounted for 64% of all
money received by Supreme Court candidates.53
These are encouraging statistics. They reflect widespread
candidate participation. Apparently the combination of public
and private funding was sufficient to undertake statewide campaigns. Most important, private funding was a minority source
of funding for the Supreme Court candidates. The challenge
for North Carolina will be to continue providing sufficient
public funds and to maintain a system that provides enough

dws/news/texassouthwest/stories/052406dntexhecht.15a0c2da.ht
ml (last visited June 21, 2006).
49. See U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “Supreme Court
Witness List for Thursday, January 12, 2006 at 9:30 a.m.,” available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1725 (noting
the scheduled appearances of Judges Becker, Scirica, Barry,
Aldisert, and Garth).
50. JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED
STATES JUDGES Canon 7(A)(2).
51. ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS 30-57
(2002), available at http://www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/articles_publications/publications/judcampaigns_20020201/commissionreport.pdf (last visited June 22, 2006).
52. See NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT, S.B. 1054
(2002), available at http://www.ncjudges.org/citizens/education/
about_jcra/full_text.php (last visited June 22, 2006).
53. JUSTICE AT STAKE, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 38-39
(2004), available at http://www.justiceatstake.org/iles/New
PoliticsReport2004.pdf (last visited June 22, 2006).

